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Abstract 
Inconsistent social behavior is a core psychopathological feature of borderline 
personality disorder. The goal of the present study was to examine inconsistency in 
social decision-making using simple economic social experiments. We investigated 
the decisions of 17 female patients with BPD, 24 patients with major depressive 
disorder (MDD), and 36 healthy controls in three single shot economic experiments 
measuring trust, cooperation, and punishment. BPD severity was assessed using the 
Zanarini Rating Scale for BPD. Investments across identical one-shot trust and 
punishment games were significantly more inconsistent in BPD patients than in 
controls. Such inconsistencies were only found in the social risk conditions of the 
trust and punishment conditions but not in the non-social control conditions. MDD 
patients did not show such inconsistencies. Furthermore, social support was 
negatively correlated with inconsistent decision-making in the trust and punishment 
game, which underscores the clinical relevance of this finding. 
 
Key words: Game theory, borderline personality disorder, behavioral economics, 
interpersonal behavior, intra-individual variability 
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1. Introduction 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a severe and debilitating psychiatric 
disorder that involves problems in different areas of social and psychological 
functioning. BPD psychopathology has been described as “stable instability” 
(Schmideberg, 1959). This instability includes unstable mood and identity, ambivalent 
relationships, emotional instability, behavioral impulsivity (Doll et al., 2013; 
Leichsenring et al., 2011), and increased intra-individual variation in 
neuropsychological tests (Beblo et al., 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest 
that unstable and inconsistent cognitive and behavioral traits underlie the 
multifaceted psychopathology of BPD. 
Social behavior and compliance with social norms play an important role in 
human interactions (Spitzer et al., 2007). Considering that problems in interpersonal 
relations are a core domain within BPD psychopathology (Agrawal et al., 2004), it is 
appropriate to investigate social behavior. Because of difficulties that arise when 
quantifying and operationalizing social behavior, such investigations are scarce. 
Experimental methods based on game theory developed in behavioral economics 
open up new possibilities of assessing and investigating social preferences such as 
trust, cooperation, or reaction to punishment through relatively simple social 
experiments. Such experiments consist of real social interactions involving real 
monetary incentives (Spitzer et al., 2007) and have been successfully applied to 
characterize social psychopathology across various psychiatric conditions. Using a 
game-theoretic approach offers the opportunity to better understand impairments in 
social interactions in psychopathological conditions such as BPD. 
Previous studies that investigated social trust in BPD patients with a game-
theoretic approach used repeated interactions with the same partners. In a study by 
Unoka et al. (2009) participants performed a trust game where an investor had to 
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interact with a trustee. The investor could share an amount of money with the trustee 
and the trustee could honor the investor’s trust by returning some money. The 
authors reported reduced trusting behavior in BPD patients (see also Seres et al., 
2009). Notably, these results were present only in the trust condition and not in the 
risk control condition where the investor could transfer money to a lottery. In a further 
study, King-Casas et al. (2008) were able to show that BPD patients are unable to 
maintain cooperation in a trust game. When HC played the investor role with a BPD 
trustee, investment levels were particularly lower in late rounds of a trust game 
suggesting a break in cooperation caused by social signals emitted by the BPD 
trustee (King-Casas et al., 2008). BPD participants not only ruptured cooperation, 
they were also less likely to show generous gestures to repair their break. The 
authors mentioned that a successful cooperation between two agents requires a 
range of intact computations (see also Firth & Firth 2006; Singer 2006, Sanfey et al., 
2006). Trust and cooperation, however, can easily be ruptured by unpredictable 
behavior, such as observed in BPD.  
An unstable self-concept and unpredictable and inconsistent interpersonal 
behaviors are key features in BPD (Lieb et al., 2004). BPD symptoms have 
frequently been attributed to an impairment in the underlying attachment organization 
(Levy, 2005). According to the attachment theory (Ainswort et al., 1978; Bowlby, 
1969; 1973; 1977; 1980), the affective bond between a child and a caregiver has an 
influence on the emerging self-concept of the child (for overview see Levy, 2005). 
Upon the interactions with the caregiver (or attachment figure), children build 
affective-cognitive schemata of the self and others – so called “internal working 
models”. These models are thought to influence and organize personality 
development and to shape future relationships (Bowlby, 1969). Additionally, they are 
relatively stable across lifespan (Collins & Read, 1994). Fonagy (2000) proposed that 
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a secure attachment is important because it offers the child the possibility to safely 
explore the mind of a caregiver and by doing so to learn about minds in general (see 
also Fonagy et al., 2000). Fonagy et al. (2000) called this ability mentalization, which 
is the ability to understand one’s own as well as others’ behavior and thoughts. He 
proposed that reflective and responsive parents increase the likelihood of a secure 
attachment which in turn positively influences the ability to mentalize. Mentalizing 
includes the capacity to generalize other’s intentions to new social situations and to 
adjust evaluations in repeated social interactions. Securely attached individuals with 
BPD are very rare (Levy, 2005). The childhood and youth of BPD patients are 
typically characterized through conditions that impairs mentalizing (Ball & Links, 
2009). Neglect, abuse, maltreatment through caregivers are the most obvious 
features of such conditions. Even in the absence of such significant adversities, 
caregivers frequently show severe inconsistencies in their social behavior (see 
Clarkin et al., 2007). They serve as a source of both fear and reassurance. As a 
response, their children lose their sense of a stable self and do not develop the 
capacity to predict other’s people thoughts and actions. Their impaired ability to 
mentalize contributes finally to disorganized attachment and increased risk for BDP. 
Consistent with this theory, a recent study was able to show that social support 
serves as protective factor of developing BPD (Rosenbach and Renneberg, 2014). 
We now propose that disorganized attachment styles in BPD result in inconsistent 
and unpredictable behavior when it comes to social interaction. BPD patients are 
unable to anticipate intentions or behavior of others, and therefore in turn exhibit an 
unpredictable behavior. The main goal of the present study was therefore to examine 
behavioral inconsistency in BPD using a game-theoretic approach. We used one-
shot social exchange games in order to exclude more complex influences of 
reputation formation and learning from feedback. This enabled us to investigate 
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social behavior in first encounters. Based on the inability to mentalize about other 
peoples’ thoughts and intentions the adopted relationship heuristic in BPD should 
also lead to inconsistent behavior in first encounters. We assessed social behavior in 
various situations and contexts in order to evaluate the specificity of our findings. We 
conducted a trust game, a punishment game and a coordination game. We 
hypothesized that behavioral inconsistencies are limited to social contexts and will 
not be present in non-social control conditions. Based on the finding that social 
support serves as protective factor for developing BPD, we proposed that behavioral 
inconsistencies are associated with low perceived social support. Based on the 
findings of Unoka et al., (2009) we further assumed that BPD patients should show 
decreased investment in the trust and punishment game. Furthermore, we expected 
that BPD patients would be less likely to adjust their investment behavior in a 
cooperation game given a prior interaction with a partner, because they are unable to 
mentalize about the intentions of the partner. To account for diagnostic specificity, we 
included two control groups: healthy controls (HC) and patients with major 
depressive disorder (MDD). 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Subjects 
Participants included 17 female BPD patients and 2 control groups: 24 female 
MDD patients, and 36 female HC HC were recruited via flyers, newspaper 
advertisements, and personal contact at the University Hospital of Psychiatry in Bern, 
where they were assessed. Patients (BPD and MDD) were recruited via personal 
contact at the University Hospital of Psychiatry in Bern. Psychopathology was 
assessed using the Structured Clinical Interview (SKID) for DSM-IV axes I (First et 
al., 2002) and II (First et al., 1997) disorders in both patients and HC control group. 
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Experienced clinicians and researchers performed diagnostics and symptom rating. 
Inclusion criteria for HC were no history of psychiatric or physical disorders and no 
current drug or medication use. The inclusion criterion for BPD patients was a current 
diagnosis of BPD. The inclusion criterion for MDD patients was a current diagnosis of 
MDD. Other psychiatric disorders such as affective disorder, eating disorder, or 
substance abuse were not part of our exclusion criteria as long as BPD/MDD 
symptoms were the most prevalent. Exclusion criteria were psychotic disorder or 
drug and alcohol abuse. Specific BPD symptom occurrence during the last week was 
assessed using the Zanarini Rating Scale for Borderline Personality Disorders ZAN-
BPD (Zanarini, 2003), and education level was measured using a rating scale 
ranging from 0 (no school finished) to 9 (high university degree). Current clinical 
symptoms were assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 
1961) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck et al., 1988). Education level and 
body mass index (BMI) were assessed through self-report. To assess experienced 
social support the 14 item Questionnaire on Social Support was used (F-SozU K-14, 
Fydrich et al., 2009). The Questionnaire on Social Support measures how a 
participant perceives social support (including emotional support, practical support 
and social integration) from his or her social network. Higher values indicate higher 
perceived social support. Current medication use was no exclusion criterion in BPD 
and MDD patients. 
Prior to the actual experiment, 64 random participants were recruited that 
served as interaction partners during the social games. These participants did not 
undergo any prior clinical assessment.  
After describing the study to the subjects, written informed consent was 
obtained. All aspects of the study were approved by the regional ethics committee 
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(Kantonale Ethikkomission Bern) and were in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki principles.  
 
2.2 Neuroeconomic games 
To investigate social behavior we used three different economic experiments: the 
trust game, cooperation game, and punishment game. In each game, player A and 
player B interacted anonymously. Players A were the patients with BPD, MDD or the 
group of healthy controls. Players B were a group of randomly selected participants, 
that were not screened for any pathologies. Players B solely served as interaction 
partners for Players A and their responses to each possible actions of player A were 
recorded in a previous session (strategy method). As an example, they were asked 
how many points they would return if a Player A would give them 0, 10, 20 … 100 
points in the Trust Game Players’ B responses were recorded by the experimenter 
and then used in the actual experiment with player A. Players’ B decisions were also 
payoff relevant because they were later paid based on their own decision and the 
decisions of players A. All players were informed that they interacted with a human 
player or a computer. Every decision in the games involved a distribution of monetary 
units (MUs), which were converted into money at the end of the experiment. 
Participants were explicitly told that their decisions were about money and they were 
informed about the conversion from MUs to real money. 
All games were independent, which means that in each round participants 
were paired with another player B. In the trust and punishment game, each round 
was computed as a one-shot game followed by feedback. In the cooperation game, 
player A played two rounds with the same players B. All games are illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
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The Trust Game consisted of two conditions: the trust condition and the non-
social risk condition. Every MU retained by the players was compensated with 0.5 
Swiss francs. In the trust game players A and B each had an initial amount of 10 
MUs. Player A could choose an amount, in the range of 0 to 10, to transfer to player 
B. The transferred MUs were multiplied by three and given to player B. Player B was 
informed about the transfer and then decided how many MUs to transfer back to 
player A. She could transfer any amount within a range of 0 to 10, plus the received 
transfer from player A. The final payoff for player A consisted of the initial MUs minus 
the MUs given to player B plus the MUs received from player B. In order to compare 
trusting behavior with a corresponding non-social risk, we conducted another 
experiment in which patients and controls faced the same choices as in the trust 
experiment, but the decisions were not embedded in a social interaction. In this non-
social risk condition, player B was replaced by a computer decision. Participants 
were told that they are interacting with a computer and that the computer makes its 
decision by randomly drawing from Player’s B response distribution. Responses were 
uniformly distributed around the mean in the range of ±2 SDs. Participants were 
informed of this calculation and the real behavioral data underlying it. 
Punishment behavior was investigated using a dictator game with and without 
the punishment stage (Spitzer et al., 2007). In this game, Player A had an initial 
amount of 100 MUs, from which she could transfer an amount between 0 and 100 to 
player B. Player B’s initial amount equaled 0 MUs. After the transfer, player A and 
player B received an additional endowment of 25 MUs. In the dictator condition 
without the punishment stage, the round finished here. In the punishment condition, 
player B was allowed to punish player A by deducting MUs from player A’s income. 
Punishment was costly: if player B invested one MU from her income, this resulted in 
a deduction of five MUs of A’s income. Player B could invest a maximum of 25 MUs 
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for punishment, which corresponded to a maximum deduction of 125 MUs. In this 
game, every MU retained was compensated with 0.13 Swiss francs. 
Our Cooperation Game was a variant of the minimum effort game devised by 
Huyck et al. (Huyck et al., 1990). Each player interacted with 3 other players. This 
game was played over 10 rounds, of which 2 consecutive rounds were played with 
the same players. All four players simultaneously chose one of the three effort levels 
for each round: 5, 7.5, or 10 Swiss francs. The players who chose the minimum that 
was chosen by the 4 players received their chosen number as payoff. For those who 
chose a higher number than the minimum, the difference between the chosen option 
and minimum was subtracted from the minimum. The resulting payoff table of this 
game is shown in Tab 3 of Figure 1. In this game, every MU was rewarded with 1 
Swiss franc.  
 
2.3 Statistical analysis  
We performed consistency analysis using Cronbach’s alpha for all game conditions 
(trust–non-social risk, cooperation round 1–cooperation round 2, punishment 
condition– dictator condition) in order to quantify behavioral consistency and 
compare groups. Cronbach’s alpha is calculated from pairwise correlations between 
the single-shot rounds for each group separately.  
         (1) 
N corresponds to the number of rounds in a game, r corresponds to the averaged 
correlation between the rounds and g stands for the group index (BPD, MDD or HC). 
The Fisher-Bonett test (for small samples, N < 100) was used to compare groups. 
In order to obtain an individual measurement of consistency, we calculated the 
standard deviation (SD) for each participant j depending on condition (trust, non-
αg =
N ∗ r
1+ (N −1)∗ r
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social risk, punishment, dictator, cooperation round 1 and cooperation round 2). SDj 
measures the amount of variation (or dispersion) from the mean  of a participant j. 
Hence, a low SD indicates that all measured values m are close to the individual 
mean — the participant is consistent in what she is doing. A high SD indicates that 
the measured values are spread out over a large range—the participant is less 
consistent. 
         (2) 
Furthermore, we performed analysis of variance in order to investigate mean 
differences in investment between the three diagnostic groups (control, MDD, BPD) 
depending on game.  
Trust Game: We calculated repeated measures ANOVA with “condition” (trust, 
non-social risk) and “round” (rounds 1–4) as within-subject factors and “diagnosis” as 
the between-subject factor. 
Punishment Game: We calculated repeated measures ANOVA with “game 
type” (punishment, dictator) and “round” (rounds 1–5) as within-subject factors and 
“diagnosis” as the between-subject factor. 
Cooperation Game: In the cooperation game, players played two rounds as 
part of the same group. Therefore, investment in round 2 depended on the minimum 
in round 1. We calculated a multilevel regression for repeated measures (Hoffman 
and Rovine, 2007). This method enabled us to analyze the cooperation behavior in 
round 2i of each participant j depending on the minimum in round 1. The dependent 
variable was the cooperation behavior (investment) in round 2. We proposed that the 
minimum in round 1 predicted cooperation behavior in round 2.  
yj
yj
SDj =
(yjm − yj )2
m=1
n
∑
n−1
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The Level 1 predictor was the grand mean-centered minimum in round 1. The 
Level 2 predictor was diagnosis. Two dummy variables represented the control group 
and the MD group, whereas the BPD group was assigned the reference category.  
Level 1:           (3) 
      
Level 2:           (4) 
 
Parameter γ00 is the fixed effect of the intercept and reflects investment behavior of 
the BPD group in round 2 for an average minimum in round 1. Parameter γ01 and γ02 
describe how the investment behavior (or γ00) changes for the MD and control group 
respectively. Parameter γ10 constitutes the fixed effect of the slope, and in this case 
describes the increase of investment behavior of the BPD group in round 2, 
depending on the minimum in round 1. Parameters γ11 and γ12 then describe how γ10 
changes for the MD and control group respectively. Parameters u0j and  u1j finally 
describe the random intercept and random slope for each participant.  
 
3. Results  
Demographic and clinical characteristics of the 17 BPD patients, 24 MDD patients, 
and 36 HC are presented in Table 1 and 2. HC, BPD and MDD groups were 
frequency matched according to education. HC and BPD were also matched 
according to age. 
 
3.1 Inconsistency behavior in social-decision experiments 
Yij = βoj +β1 j ⋅Minimum1+εij
β0 j = γ00 +γ01 ⋅MD+γ02 ⋅Control +υ0 j
β1 j = γ10 +γ11 ⋅MD+γ12 ⋅Control +υ1 j
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Fisher-Bonett tests were used to compare the patient groups to the control group. 
Results are presented in Table 3. BPD patients significantly differed in consistency 
when compared to HC during the trust condition and the punishment condition (p ≤ 
0.01). When compared to participants with MDD, BPD individuals exhibited a 
significant difference in the trust game (p = 0.02), showing themselves to be less 
consistent, and but only a trend towards significance in the punishment condition (p= 
0.07). There were no differences in the non-social risk condition of the trust game 
and the dictator game (p > 0.2). There was neither a significant difference in the first 
round of the cooperation game between BPD and HC (p = 0.07) nor when BPD 
individuals were compared to MDD participants (p = 0.21). MDD patients showed a 
greater consistency in the second round of the cooperation game when compared to 
HC (p = 0.048) and but not compared to BPD (p = 0.07).  
The SDs were correlated with the Social support values obtained from the 
Questionnaire on Social Support for each condition. Correlation coefficients and p-
values are presented in Table 4. There was a significant negative correlation 
between the SD in the trust condition and perceived social support (p = 0.04), 
meaning that the SD decreased as perceived social support increased. Furthermore, 
there was a significant negative correlation between the SD in the punishment 
condition and perceived social support (p = 0.03), showing that the SD in the 
punishment condition decreased when perceived social support increased. This 
effect was more pronounced for the BPD patient groups (p ≤ 0.08) than for the 
healthy controls (p ≤ 0.32).  
 
3.2 Average investments in social-decision experiments 
Trust Game: A repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant differences 
between the trust game and the non-social risk condition, F(1, 74) = 0.7, p = 0.41, η2 
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= 0.01 (Figure 2). Investment increased with number of rounds in the trust game, F(3, 
6) = 11.52, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.14, but not in the non-social risk condition, F(3, 6) = 0.23, 
p = 0.88, η2 = 0.003. This difference was significant, F(3,222) = 4.1, p = 0.007, η2 = 
0.05. Diagnostic groups did not differ in overall investment averaged across both the 
trust game and the non-social risk condition, F(2, 74) = 0.28, p = 0.76, η2= 0.01. 
None of the remaining interactions reached significance (p > 0.7) 
Punishment Game: A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference between investment in the punishment game and investment in the 
dictator game, F(1, 74) = 31.03, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.3 (Figure 3). Investment was higher 
in the punishment game than in the dictator game. There was no main effect for 
round, F(4, 296) = 1.81, p = 0.13, η2 = 0.02 and no difference between the diagnostic 
groups, F(1, 74) = 0.32, p = 0.73, η2 = 0.01. None of the interactions were significant 
(p > 0.6). 
Cooperation Game: The random intercept model without predictors (null-
model) revealed a significant proportion of inter-individual variance in cooperation 
behaviors in round 2, s2(υ"#) = 0.66, z = 3.19, p = 0.001. The intra-class correlation 
was 0.19 (s2(υ"#) / (s2(υ"#) + s2(ε%#) ), s2(ε%#) = 2.9, z = 12.41, p < 0.01).  
The results showed that the mean investment in round 2 was γ00 = 7.55, 
F(1,70) = 822.34, p < 0.001. There was no difference in cooperation behavior in the 
second round between MDD patients and BPD patients, γ01 = -0.33, F(1, 72) = 0.93, 
p = 0.34, and between HC and BPD patients, γ02 = -0.06, F(1, 71) = 0.04, p = 0.85. 
However, the minimum in round 1 significantly predicted cooperation behavior in 
round 2, γ10 = 0.4, F(1, 52) = 4.29, p = 0.04. Cooperation behavior (round 2) 
increased with minimum in round 1. None of the interactions were significant (p > 
0.37), indicating that the minimum in round 1 did not differentially affect the 
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cooperation behavior in round 2 depending on diagnosis (see supplementary 
material for results summary table). 
 
4. Discussion 
Inconsistent behavior in BPD was found in the trust and punishment game. 
Importantly, inconsistencies were only observed in the social risk conditions of these 
games. There were no mean differences in behavior between the different diagnostic 
groups. Furthermore, BPD, MDD, and HC participants did not differ in their 
dependency of payoff 2 on payoff 1 in the cooperation game. Interestingly, perceived 
social support, measured with the Questionnaire on Social Support, was strongly and 
negatively correlated with behavioral inconsistency in the trust and punishment 
conditions. 
In contrast to King-Cases et al. (2008) and Unoka et al. (2009) we used one-
shot trials in two of our experiments in which each interaction can be considered a 
first encounter with an unfamiliar partner. We were now able to show that a social 
context results in inconsistent social behavior in BPD patients. BPD patients were 
less consistent in the trust and the punishment game when compared to HC and 
MDD. We propose that BPD patients are not only unpredictable when it comes to 
social interactions; they also might show a generally less consistent behavior when it 
comes to first encounters. An explanation for the phenomenon will be provided in the 
next section. 
As also described in the introduction, unpredictable and inconsistent behavior 
in BPD may be the result of experienced parental rejection and inconsistent 
treatment by caregivers during childhood (Zanarini et al., 2000). Fear of 
abandonment is one of the core features in BPD (Berenson et al., 2011; Rosenbach 
and Renneberg, 2014; Staebler et al., 2011). Rosenbach and Renneberg (2014) 
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recently were able to show that ‘rejection sensitivity’ mediates the relationship 
between parental rejection and BPD characteristics. This means, parental rejection is 
only associated with BPD symptoms in patients with high rejection sensitivity. 
Interestingly, perceived social support serves as protective factor, which diminishes 
the risk of developing BPD.  
Consistent with this assumption, we were able to show that perceived social 
support was lower in BPD patients when compared to healthy controls. Moreover, 
perceived social support ratings correlated negatively with behavioral inconsistencies 
in the games: the lower the perceived social support scores, the higher the 
behavioral inconsistency. Although we cannot draw a causal conclusion from this 
finding, based on the attachment theory it is possible that inconsistent, neglecting or 
abusing treatment of caregivers during childhood leads to a disturbed ability to 
mentalize about others’ intentions, which in turn results in the belief that others are 
unreliable and uncaring. This inner representation of others’ intentions results in 
uncertain, inconsistent and unpredictable social behaviors in BPD patients and also 
guides inconsistent behavior in first encounters.  
  We did not find any mean differences in the trust and punishment game 
between BPD and the control groups, although a previous study by Unoka et al. 
(2009) reported reduced trust in BPD across 5 consecutive transactions. 
Furthermore, HC and MDD increased their investment across five rounds whereas 
BPD patients did not. In contrast to our study, participants were in each round 
interacting with the same trustee but did not receive feedback about the back 
transfer. The authors proposed that in the absence of feedback, BPD patients lose 
trust during sequential transactions. In the present study participants received 
feedback and they were in each round interacting with another trustee. We found a 
strong linear relationship in the social risk condition of the trust game; investment 
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increased with number of rounds. This finding suggests that our participants learnt 
from the ‘trustee population’ during each round. Interestingly, Franzen et al. (2011) 
proposed a superior ‘theory of mind’ in BPD because BPD patients adjusted their 
investment to the objective fairness of a partner in a multiround trust game, whereas 
healthy controls disregard the objective fairness of a partner when emotional facial 
expressions are present. Although we were able to control for reputation effects we 
can hence not fully exclude learning from feedback. It would therefore be interesting 
to investigate these learning effects in future studies.  
Although we were able to provide preliminary evidence for inconsistent 
interpersonal behavior in BPD patients using a game theoretic approach, several 
limitations merit comment. We were not able to confirm our hypothesis for the 
cooperation game. BPD patients showed only a trend towards significance for a less 
consistent investment behavior in the first round of the cooperation game compared 
to HC. Furthermore, the patient groups did not differ in their dependency of payoff 2 
on payoff 1 in the cooperation game. Additionally, our sample size was relatively 
small and we only tested female participants, which was due to the higher prevalence 
of BPD in women. Therefore, future studies should aim to replicate the present 
findings. Furthermore, MDD patients were significantly older than the BPD patients. 
Fett et al. (2014) investigated trust and cooperation in groups of subjects ranging 
from adolescence to mid-adulthood. They reported that increasing age is associated 
with higher trust. Sutter and Kocher (2007) examined trust and trustworthiness in 
different age groups and they reported a linear increase from early childhood to early 
adulthood. Within the different adult age groups, however, trust remains constant. 
We only tested adult participants. Therefore, we propose that differences in BPD and 
MDD patients are most likely not due to age difference. However, no study has yet 
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investigated behavioral consistency in social decision-making across different age 
group.  
Future studies should involve imaging techniques in order to provide further 
understanding of the neural network underlying BPD-specific inconsistent behavior. 
Areas such as the anterior insula, the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex have been implicated as target regions of BPD (King-
Casas et al., 2008; Seres et al., 2009; Spitzer et al., 2007). Furthermore, Berdahl 
(2010) suggested the involvement of the vmPFC in a neural network model of BPD. 
This area is important for decisions regarding social preferences. The games used in 
the present study would be well suited to investigate the neural basis underlying 
behavioral inconsistency in BPD. 
In conclusion, the results of our study suggest that BPD patients behave 
inconsistently in different kinds of social interactions games even in first encounters. 
Furthermore, inconsistencies in social behavior were associated with a lack of 
perceived social support. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to show 
behavioral inconsistencies in BPD in an experimental design. Future studies should 
investigate the neural basis of behavioral inconsistency in BPD and whether 
inconsistent behavior is also evident in multi-round games. 
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Table 1: Demographical data  
HC, healthy controls; BPD, borderline personality disorder; MDD, major depressive disorder. BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; 
BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory; GAF, Global Assessment of Functioning Scale; Social support, Questionnaire on Social Support; 
ZAN-BPD, Zanarini Rating Scale for BPD. Standard deviations are indicated in brackets. 
aPosthoc testing: MDD patients were significantly older than BPD patients (t(39) = 3.21, p = 0.003). There was no significant 
difference in age between HC and MDD or HC and BPD. 
bPosthoc testing: In comparison to HC, scores for BDI were higher in MDD (t(24.79) = -11.52, p < 0.001) and in BPD (t(16.48) = 
-5.33, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference in BDI scores between BPD and MDD. 
cPosthoc testing: In comparison to HC, scores for BAI were higher in MDD (t(23.82) = -7.01, p < 0.001) and in BPD (t(16.67) = -
5.00, p < 0.001). There was no significant difference in BAI scores between BPD and MDD. 
dPosthoc testing: BPD patients had a higher overall ZAN-BPD score than HC(t(16.02) = -7.39, p < 0.001) and MDD (t(22.19) = -
5.27, p < 0.001). MDD patients had a higher overall ZAN-BPD score than HC (t(22.16) = -3.71, p = 0.001). 
ePosthoc testing: Although GAF was higher for the subjects with MDD than for the healthy controls (t(24.17) = 12.85, p < 0.001], 
there was no difference in GAF scores between BPD and MDD. The GAF score of 88.61 points for the healthy group indicated 
absent or minimal symptoms, good functioning in all areas, and interest and involvement in a wide range of activities. The score 
of 55.08 obtained by the MDD patients indicated the presence of moderate difficulties in social or occupational functioning. 
fPosthoc testing: Social support as measured by the Questionnaire on Social Support was higher in HC than in BPD (t(20.85) = 
-3.89 p = 0.001) or MDD (t(58) = 3.81, p < 0.001). There was, however, no difference in social support between BPD and MDD. 
 HC BPD MDD Statistics 
Age 36.97 (11.95) 30.53 (11.06) 43.63 (14.02) F(2, 74) = 5.6, p 
= 0.005a 
Education 5 (1.87) 4 (1.12) 4.21 (1.64) n.s. 
BDI 1.5 (2.51) 19.88 (14.11) 26.5 (10.43) F(2, 74) = 
62.19, p < 
0.001b 
BAI 2.03 (2.08) 14.18 (9.99) 20.33 (12.69) F(2, 74) = 
35.02, p < 
0.001c 
Zan-BPD 0.06 (0.23) 10.82 (6) 6.46 (19.94) F(2, 73) = 
63.03, p < 
0.001d 
GAF 88.61 (2.46) 57.53 (12.86) 55.08 (12.63) F(2, 74) = 
115.22, p < 
0.001e 
BMI 22.74 (3.51) 26.21 (6.75) 25.71 (7.91) n.s. 
Social support 4.48 (0.47) 3.63 (0.84) 3.89 (0.65) F(2, 74) = 
12.84, p < 
0.001f 
Compensation 
Money 
46.16 (9.07) 45.44 (7.8) 46.46 (8.1) 
n.s. 
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Table 2: Comorbidities in Borderline personality disorder (BPD), major depressive 
disorder (MDD) and healthy controls (HC). 
HC, healthy controls; BPD, borderline personality disorder; MDD, major depressive disorder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HC in % BPD  in % MDD in % 
Substance 
Abuse 
0 0 3 18 1 4.2 
Affective 
Disorder 
0 0 7 41 NA NA 
Anxiety 
Disorder 
0 0 10 59 12 50 
Eating 
Disorder 
0 0 9 53 6 25 
Smokers 10 28 13 76 13 54 
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Table 3: Results of the behavioral consistency analysis comparing Borderline 
personality disorder (BPD), major depressive disorder (MDD) and healthy controls 
(HC): BPD patients significantly differed in behavioral consistency from HC in the 
punishment condition of the punishment game and in the social-risk condition of the 
trust game. 
 
 Group Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Sample 
size 
No. of 
items 
Z 
statistics 
BPD & 
MDD vs. 
control 
p 
 
Z 
statistics 
BPD vs. 
MDD 
p 
Punishment 
Condition HC 0.886 36 5 
    
 BPD 0.66 17 5 -2.23 0.01
**   
 MDD 0.847 24 5 -0.68 0.25 -1.51 0.066
a 
Dictator 
Condition HC 0.914 36 5 
    
 BPD 0.875 17 5 -0.76 0.22   
 MDD 0.91 24 5 -0.11 0.46 -0.62 0.27 
Trust 
Condition HC 0.79 36 4 
    
 BPD 0.326 17 4 -2.38 0.009**   
 MDD 0.79 24 4 0 0.5 -2.13 0.02* 
Non-Social-
Risk 
Condition 
HC 0.737 36 4     
 BPD 0.739 17 4 0.02 .51   
 MDD 0.616 24 4 -0.85 .2 -0.71 .24 
Cooperation 
Rounds 1 HC 0.675 36 5 
    
 BPD 0.34 17 5 -1.45 .07
a   
 MDD 0.571 24 5 -0.64 .26 -0.81 0.21 
 24 
Cooperation 
Rounds 2 HC 0.397 36 5     
 BPD 0.361 17 5 -0.12 .45   
 MDD 0.706 24 5 -1.66 .048* -1.47 .07a 
HC, healthy controls; BPD, borderline personality disorder; MDD, major depressive disorder 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Spearman’s rank order correlation between standard deviation of 
decision-making (SD) and social support. 
 
 SD trust SD 
nonsocial 
risk 
SD 
punishment 
SD 
dictator 
SD Coop 
1 
SD Coop 
2 
Social 
support1 -0.24* -0.19 -0.25* -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 
p 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.54 0.94 0.33 
1Social support, Questionnaire on social support; SD, standard deviation 
*p<.05  
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Figure legend 
 
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the social games: 1. Trust Game, 2. Punishment 
Game, 3. Cooperation Game. 
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Figure 2. Investment in the trust game depending on diagnostic group  
and condition. Analysis of variance revealed no significant difference between 
groups. Investment increased in the social risk condition with increasing number of  
rounds. 
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Figure 3. Investment in the punishment game depending on diagnostic group 
(Borderline personality disorder (BPD), major depression (MDD) and healthy controls 
(HC)) and condition: There was no mean difference between the diagnostic groups. 
BPD patients, however, showed a greater behavioral inconsistency, which can also 
be seen in the shading of the standard error in the social risk condition (punishment). 
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